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An Analysis of Haitian Requests for Political Asylum
After Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti
An alien who seeks political asylum in the United States may face
serious problems in attempting to remain here. To remain in this coun-
try in political asylum, an alien must establish a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to his or her home country.' Courts addition-
ally have required an alien to show involvement in political action and
fear of persecution because of that action. Courts, however, have not
defined explicitly .the timing or form of political action necessary to
support an asylum claim.
Problems faced by Haitians seeking political asylum here illustrate
the difficulties encountered by large groups of aliens attempting to re-
main in the United States as political refugees. Many Haitians seek
asylum here, only to be returned to Haiti.2 Those who are returned to
Haiti may face severe punishment for having claimed asylum abroad,
for having left Haiti in contravention of Haitian law, or for having
taken part in "political" activity before leaving Haiti-activity that
may not be considered political in the United States. Traditionally,
none of these bases of persecution would justify a claim of political
asylum.
In Haitian Refugee Center v. C'viletti,3 Judge King examined con-
ditions in Haiti, concluding that some acts not conventionally consid-
ered political may, in the peculiar context of Haitian culture, be
political. 4 Although Judge King examined these conditions only as a
preface to his examination of the processing of asylum requests in the
United States, and his conclusions are only dicta, his opinion is never-
theless important. By taking into account the particular conditions in
an alien's home country, Judge King's conclusions broaden the scope
of both the timing and form of political action that may provide the
basis for a claim of political asylum.
This Comment analyzes the expanded bases of political action
provided by Hfaitian Refugee Center. First, to provide a foundation for
the analysis that follows, the immigration laws concerning political asy-
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. IV 1980) (asylum); id § 1253(h) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
(relief from deportation).
2. It is estimated that more than 17,000 Haitians currently are in the*United States.
See text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
3. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), af'd as modfed sub nomr Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
4. Id. at 510.
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lum conditions in Haiti and the procedural context and holding of Hai-
tian Refugee Center are discussed. The Comment then examines the
dual requirement of political persecution and political action. Using
the framework suggested by Judge King, the Comment discusses con-
ventional definitions of the form and timing of political action and of-
fers an expanded view of timing, which includes actions taken after
departure from the home country, and of form, which includes actions
based on economics or on personal encounters.
The Comment concludes that Haitian Refugee Center could pro-
vide the conceptual basis for a more general standard of political asy-
lum. The traditional function of political asylum is to provide
individuals with a legitimate residential status when some political ac-
tivity prior to departure from their home country would cause the alien
to be persecuted upon return. The expanded concept of political asy-
lum found in Haitian Refugee Center could break down the traditional,
narrowly defined mechanism of political asylum and allow many. refu-
gees who could not satisfy traditional requirements to obtain asylum.
While broadening the concept of political asylum to include refu-
gees such as Haitians is one method of ensuring their freedom from
persecution, it would be preferable to enact special legislation allowing
the refugees to remain in the United States. The valid purposes of a
provision concerning political asylum should not be distorted through
judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in order to pro-
vide asylum for aliens whose suffering is caused by governmental ac-
tions not conventionally considered political. Instead, it should be
recognized that such persecution should be prohibited under general
concepts of the right of humans to freedom from persecution.
Immigration Laws: Political Asylum and
Withholding of Deportation
Before World War II, no specific law governed the admission of
refugees.- After the war, the United States participated in international
efforts to solve refugee problems, enacting legislation for the admission
of refugees to the United States.6 In 1950, Congress enjoined the Attor-
5. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, §§ 2.24Aa,
2.3i (1981) [hereinafter cited as GORDON & ROSENFIELD]. For a discussion of the history of
the immigration laws, emphasizing provisions made for political and religious refugees, see
Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW.
204 (1969).
6. Legislative enactments included: Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat.
1009, amended by Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219, and Act of June 28, 1951, ch.
167, 65 Stat. 96 (allowed entry of more than 400,000 refugees, charging the numbers to the
immigration quotas); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (allowed admission of
214,000 refugees within a three-and-one-half-year period as nonquota immigrants; expired
Dec. 31, 1956); Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (allowed two more
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ney General from deporting an alien to a country in which he or she
would be subject to physical persecution.7 This restraint on deporta-
tion formed the foundation of political asylum provisions now found in
domestic law. The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,8 however, established that decisions to withhold deportation
when there was fear of such persecution were discretionary with the
Attorney General. 9
In 1967, the United States ratified the Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees.10 The Protocol did not create a right of entry for refu-
gees or set forth a procedure for their admission." Rather, it merely
created the right of refugees within the United States to avoid expul-
sion to a country in which their lives or freedom would be threatened
because of their political opinions.' 2 The Protocol's status has been ar-
gued in the courts,' 3 but it appears to have the force of law under the
years to carry out admissions begun under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953); Fair Share Law
of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (authorized Attorney General to "parole" into the
United States "alien refugee-escapee(s)"). See generally Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d
Cir. 1970); 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 5, § 2.24Aa.
7. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010 (repealed 1952).
8. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1976 & Supp.
1980)).
9. Id. § 243(h) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976 & Supp. 1980)).
10. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (in force Oct. 10, 1967). The
Protocol incorporated the terms of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
19 U.S.T. 6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 152, which gave a refugee the right to avoid
expulsion to a country in which his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.
art. 33. The United States did not sign the Convention.
1 I. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the United States is a signa-
tory, creates "the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 14 (1948). The Universal Declaration, however, is not
a binding document; it merely sets forth a "common standard of achievement" to which
member states should strive. Id. Preamble. For a discussion of international instruments
concerning refugees, see Nanda, World Refugee Assistance: The Role of International Law
and Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 449 (1981).
12. This protection is afforded only to those refugees deemed to be within the United
States. Chim Ming v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911
(1975); Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973), a 'd sub nom. Yu Fung
Cheng v. Rinaldi, 493 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierre v. United
States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated and.remanded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); Sannon v.
United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated and remanded, 566 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir. 1978). See generaly Frank, Effect of the 1967 United Nations Protocol on the Status of
Refugees in the United States, I1 INT'L LAW. 291, 295-99 (1977); Mackler & Weeks, The
Fleeing PoilcalRefugee'r Final Hurdle-The Immigration and Nationality Act, 5 N. Ky. L.
REv. 9 (1978); Nanda, World Refugee Assistance: The Role of International Law and Institu-
tions, 9 HoFsTRA L. REV. 449, 453-57 (1981); Note, Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. A Closer Look at Immigration Law and the Political Refugee, 6 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 133, 149-53 (1978).
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Constitution. 14
The Refugee Act of 198015 incorporated some features of the Pro-
toco116 and provided a statutory basis for political asylum. The Act
also amended section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
which provides for procedures for the withholding of deportation.' 7
Today, under the Act, an alien may seek political asylum in the United
States through both the asylum procedures and the procedures for the
withholding of deportation.' 8
Asylum
The Refugee Act of 1980 defines a refugee as an alien who has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, political
opinion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group.' 9 The
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973); NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE 8-27 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD]. See generally Frank, Effect of the 1967 United Nations Proto-
col on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 11 INT'L LAW. 291 (1977).
15. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h) (Supp. IV 1980)).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 160, 160-61.
17. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)
(Supp. IV 1980)).
18. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 182(d)(5) (Supp. IV 1980)). See generally I GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 5,
§§ 2.24Af, 2.3i; IA id. § 5.16. Other methods of entry commonly used by aliens not eligible
for political asylum include parole into the United States and conditional entry status.
Under the parole power, the Attorney General can parole an alien into the United States
temporarily; the alien is not deemed to have "entered" the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). The parole power was recently amended to limit its use to
parole on an individual basis and to eliminate the possibility of group parole. Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
(Supp. IV 1980)).
Conditional entry status was created in 1965 to allow the admission of refugees from
communist countries, from the Middle East, or from countries disturbed by a natural calam-
ity. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 912 (1965) (adding § 203(a)(7)
to Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952). The government was criticized for limiting the
applicability of this provision to aliens from communist countries and the Middle East be-
cause this provision created the only method of asylum for refugees who had not yet entered
the United States. See Hanson, Behind the Paper Curtain." Asylum Policy versus Asylum
Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 107, 127 (1978). Conditional entry status was
abolished by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(c), 94 Stat. 102, 107.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp. IV 1980). This section provides in pertinent part:
"The term 'refugee' means [any person outside his or her country of nationality or within the
country of nationality but in special circumstances specified by the President] . . . who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."
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Act provides for the establishment of an asylum procedure that must be
made available to an alien "physically present in the United States or
at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status. 20
Thus, in contrast to asylum procedures under the Protocol, the statu-
tory asylum procedure is not limited to aliens within the United States
and provides a method of admission for aliens outside the United
States.21 An alien may be granted asylum only if he or she is deter-
mined to be a refugee under the Act.22
Under the procedures promulgated pursuant to the Act,23 the dis-
trict director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has
jurisdiction over asylum requests made at a port of entry before exclu-
sion or deportation proceedings. 24 While the district director has some
discretion in deciding to grant or deny an asylum application, the ap-
plication must be denied in certain situations, such as when the district
director finds that the alien is not a refugee. 25 An alien has no appeal
from the decision of the district director, 26 but may renew the applica-
tion in deportation or exclusion proceedings.27
Withholding of Deportation
An alien who is already in exclusion or deportation proceedings
before an immigration judge may apply for asylum, or renew his or her
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. IV 1980).
21. The definition of "refugees" under the Act includes those aliens still within their
country of nationality, in such special circumstances as the President may specify. Id.
§ I 101(a)(42)(B). Thus, "refugees" can include certain persons who have a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion, but who have not yet left their home countries. The Act
gives the President the authority to admit 50,000 refugees per year through fiscal year 1982,
and thereafter to admit as many, after consultation, as are justified by humanitarian con-
cers or otherwise in the Public interest. Refugee Act of 1980, § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1157
(Supp. IV 1980). In addition, the President may authorize the admission of additional num-
bers of refugees in "an unforeseen emergency refugee situation." Id.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
23. 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1980).
24. Id. § 208.1. The alien must apply for asylum and has the burden of establishing
that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to the country of his or her nationality. Id.
§§ 208.2, 208.5. In reaching a decision to grant or deny asylum, the district director must
request an advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
which is part of the State Department. Id. § 208.7.
25. Id. § 208.8-
26. Id. § 208.8(c).
27. Id. § 208.9. It has been suggested that it is possible to have defacto asylum when
the district director denies an alien's asylum request and, under 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(iv),
grants a voluntary departure on an extended basis. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note
14, at 8-34. A grant of asylum extends for one year, after one year, the alien's status is
reviewed and the asylum extended or terminated, or the alien may be eligible for an adjust-
ment of status to that of permanent resident. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e) (1980).
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asylum request if it has been denied by a district director. 28 The re-
quest will then be considered an application for withholding of depor-
tation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.29
Section 243(h) originally created a dual level of review. The At-
torney General determined first whether the alien would be subject to
persecution and then whether to exercise his discretion in granting re-
lief. The original standard under section 243(h) was that of "physical
persecution." 30 The "physical persecution" standard was interpreted
narrowly. One court stated, "Physical persecution involves a grave
challenge to those personal rights . . . fundamental to our constitu-
tional scheme . . . . "3 The courts considered physical persecution to
involve only such serious threats as those of confinement, torture or
death, 32 or "economic sanctions so severe as to deprive a person of all
means of earning a livelihood. '33 The requirement of physical perse-
cution, however, was criticized as too narrow34 on the grounds that the
standard placed an onerous burden on the alien 35 and did not contem-
plate methods of persecution apart from bodily violence. 36 Section
243(h) therefore was amended in 1965. 37
The 1965 amendment altered the standard to require the alien to
show that he or she "would be subject to persecution on account of
race, religion or political opinion. ' 38 The emphasis was thus shifted
from the result of the persecution-physical harm-to the motivation
for the persecution-race, religion, or political opinion.39 This change
28. Id. §§ 208.1, 208.8, 208.9.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980); see 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1980).
30. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214; see
Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 1963) (Moore, J., dissenting).
There was little legislative history on the purpose of § 243(h). See Szlajmer v. Esperdy,
188 F. Supp. 491, 499 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). As the court in Szlajmer noted, there was "a
legislative dread that deportation for some aliens might well amount to a death sentence. To
accord a hearing in such circumstances is not alone to advance the cause of the alien, but our
own ideals of democratic justice as well. To deny one is to rob this remedial legislation of its
vitality and, worse, to transform it into an instrument of oppression." Id. at 499.
31. Chi Sheng Liu v. Wolton, 297 F.2d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1961).
32. Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
33. Soric v. Flagg, 303 F.2d 289, 290 (7th Cir. 1962); see also Dunat v. Hurney, 297
F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1962); Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 844 (1961).
34. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 535, 887 (1965); Hearings on H.R.
2580 Before Subcomin. No. 1 of the House Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 213, 217
(1965); Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Judiciary Comm., 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 860-61 (1964).
35. See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 1969).
36. See id. at 106 n.9.
37. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, § 11(f), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 918.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h) (1976).
39. See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d at 107. Although some courts phrased the 1952 stan-
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was intended to broaden the applicability of section 243(h) and to
lighten the burden imposed on the alien by removing the requirement
that the alien demonstrate threatened bodily harm.40
Section 243(h) was amended by the Refugee Act of 198041 to state
in part: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien
. . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion. '42
The amendment made several important changes. First, the Attor-
ney General-or his or her delegate, the immigration judge43-no
longer has the discretion to decide whether to deport the alien. Once it
is determined that the alien is entitled to relief under section 243(h), the
statute mandates that the Attorney General grant relief.44 Second, re-
lief under section 243(h) is no longer limited to aliens "within the
United States." 45 Third, an alien has two bases on which to show a
dard as physical persecution motivated by race, religion, or political opinion, see, e.g.,
Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961), the stat-
ute was not so phrased.
40. See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d at 106.
41. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. The purpose of the Act was to establish a compre-
hensive refugee resettlement and assistance policy and to give "statutory meaning to our
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns." S. REP. No. 96-256;
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 141.
42. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980)).
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976).
44. "The Attorney General shallnot deport an alien. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-212, § 202(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980))
(emphasis added).
45. Prior to 1980, an alien who was not deemed to be "within" the United States did
not have access to § 243(h) relief from deportation. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1958); see Frank, Effect of the 1967 United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees in the
United States, 11 INT'L LAW. 291, 293 (1977); Mackler & Weeks, The F-leeing Political Refu-
gee's Final Hurdle-The Immigration and Nationality Act, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 7, 11 (1978).
This resulted from the language of § 243(h): "The Attorney General is authorized to with-
hold the deportation of any alien within the United States. . . ." Ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat.
163, 214 (emphasis added). Since the 1980 amendment, § 243(h) relief is available to aliens
who are not "within" the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.11; IA GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 5, § 5.16(b), at 5-181.
Under the pre-1980 standard, an alien who was subject to exclusion was not deemed to
be within the United States under § 243(h), and thus could not present his or her asylum
claim at a later exclusion hearing. See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977);
Frank, supra; Mackler & Weeks, supra; Comment, Due Process Rightsfor Excludable Aliens
under United States Immigration Law andthe United Nations Protocol Relating to the Statute
of Refugees-Haitian Aliens, a Case in Point, 10 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 203 (1977). But
see Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 127 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated and remanded, 566
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978) (immigration judge has authority under the Protocol to hear an
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threat to life or freedom in addition to race, religion, and political opin-
ion: nationality and membership in a particular social group.
Confusion may be caused by the different standards to be used in
asylum and withholding of deportation procedures. An alien is both a
"refugee" and eligible for the asylum procedure if he or she has a
"well-founded fear of [political] persecution. ' 46 An alien in a deporta-
tion proceeding, however, currently must show under section 243(h)
that his or her "life or freedom would be threatened" because of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion, in order to avoid deportation to a particular country.4 7
Prior to 1980, the section 243(h) standard was "would be subject to
persecution. '48 Under this standard, courts have required that an alien
demonstrate a likelihood of persecution, 49 a clear probability of perse-
cution,50 or actual persecution shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.5 In some cases, an alien was required to demonstrate only a
well-founded fear of persecution to obtain section 243(h) relief 5 2
These decisions apparently derived this standard from the Protocol,
which defined a refugee as a person with a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted. '53
In Kashani v. INS,54 the court stated that the "well-founded fear"
standard of the Protocol and the "would be subject to persecution"
standard of section 243(h) were actually quite similar:
[The language of the Protocol] surely refers to more than the alien's
subjective state of mind. We hold that an alien claiming a "well
founded fear of persecution" must either demonstrate that he actu-
ally has been a victim of persecution or that his fear is more than a
matter of his own conjecture ...
This requirement can only be satisfied by objective evidence that
alien's asylum claim in exclusion hearings; opinion vacated and remanded on question of
mootness in light of new regulations promulgated by the INS).
Excludable aliens are those who have been found excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). An excludable alien now may present his or her asylum claim at
the exclusionary hearing. This hearing, however, does not provide the alien with protection
as great as that provided in the deportation hearing, because the alien is not entitled to the
procedural safeguards granted to the deportable alien. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra
note 14, at § 5.4(c).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (Supp. IV 1980); see id. § 1158(a).
47. Id. § 1253(h).
48. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
49. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1981); In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70
(1968).
50. Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967).
51. Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. See, e.g., Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Franqois,
15 1. & N. Dec. 534, 539 (1975); see also In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
53. See note 10 supra. See In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
54. 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977).
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the alien's assertions are correct. Thus, the "well founded fear" stan-
dard contained in the Protocol and the "clear probability" standard
which this court has engrafted onto section 243(h) will in practice
converge.55
The language of the Protocol thus underlies the "well-founded fear"
standard of asylum procedure.5 6
The courts and the INS, however, have applied the "well-founded
fear" standard of asylum in the same manner as they have applied the
"would be subject to persecution" standard under the pre-1980 version
of section 243(h). 57 Therefore, the courts and the INS may interpret
the new statutory "well-founded fear" standard of asylum in the same
manner as they have interpreted the "would be subject to persecution"
standard under the pre-1980 version of section 243(h). The courts and
the INS thus would have some guidance for their interpretation of the
new statutory asylum provision.
Congress also changed the language of section 243(h). 58 The new
"life or freedom would be threatened" standard of section 243(h)
would seem to be more difficult to satisfy than the "would be subject to
persecution" standard, because a specific kind of harm must be demon-
strated, rather than merely some kind of persecution.5 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, in a case decided under new section 243(h), has
interpreted these two standards as being equivalent.60 Thus, it seems
that this distinction in terminology will not affect a court's determina-
tion of section 243(h) requests.
Although old section 243(h), new section 243(h), and the statutory
definition of "refugee" used in the asylum procedure all use different
language to describe the showing an alien must make to be granted
asylum, in practice the courts and the INS may interpret them to be the
same standard. The INS regulations governing requests for asylum
provide that an asylum applicant must show a "well-founded fear of
persecution. ' 61 This standard seems to apply both to the asylum proce-
dure62 and to the procedure for seeking a section 243(h) withholding of
55. Id. at 379.
56. See notes 15-16, 19 & accompanying text supra.
57. See note 37 & accompanying text and text accompanying note 48 supra.
58. See notes 41-42 & accompanying text supra.
59. This standard could thus be interpreted as a return to the pre-1965 emphasis on the
kind of persecution rather than on the motivation for the persecution. See notes 31-40 &
accompanying text supra.
60. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981): "The elements necessary to
withholding of deportation of [the petitioner include]: 1. A likelihood of persecution; Ze., a
threat to life or freedom."
61. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1980).
62. Id. § 208.8.
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deportation. 63
Deportation Procedure and Judicial Review
In a deportation hearing in which an alien presents a section
243(h) request, the alien has the burden of proving a well-founded fear
of persecution if returned to the home country.64 In contrast to the asy-
lum hearing before the district director, the alien in a deportation hear-
ing may present oral testimony in addition to documentary evidence,
and the INS also may present evidence.65 If the immigration judge
denies the section 243(h) request, deportation proceedings will be
continued.66
Although an alien cannot appeal the district director's denial of
asylum,67 an alien can appeal the immigration judge's denial of section
243(h) relief. The first appeal is to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. 68 The Board may make a de novo review of the record, but can-
not consider new evidence. 69 In addition, the Board may make an
independent evaluation of questions of law and fact and of discretion-
ary decisions.70 Thus, the immigration judge's decision is subject to
broad review by the Board.
Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, an alien may peti-
tion for review of a final deportation order 71 in one of the circuit courts
of appeals. 72 An alien also may seek relief in a federal district court in
some circumstances. 73 The scope of judicial review, however, is more
limited than the scope of the Board's review.74 The courts traditionally
63. Id. §§ 208.9-.10. This Comment therefore assumes that the "well-founded fear"
standard applies to both procedures.
64. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1981).
65. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(c) (1980).
66. When the asylum request is filed, the hearing is adjourned to obtain an advisory
opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Id. § 208.10(b).
Only upon denial of asylum are the exclusion or deportation proceedings reinstated. Id.
§ 208.10(f).
67. Id. § 208.8(c). See notes 26-27 & accompanying text supra.
68. The appellate jurisdiction of the Board is described in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1980).
69. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 14, at § 9.2(d).
70. Id.
71. A final order of deportation includes all determinations incident to the deportation
hearing, including denial of withholding of deportation. See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 232
(1963).
72. 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1976).
73. An alien held in custody pursuant to a deportation order may seek review through
a writ of habeus corpus. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) (1976); see also id. §§ 1105(b), 1252(c). An
alien may also seek injunctive relief, see Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961), or declaratory relief. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,
503 F. Supp. at 532-33.
74. See generally Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Stays of Deportation: Section
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 59.
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have focused on whether the INS acted in conformity with the law and
the Constitution. 75 In addition, the court's review generally is confined
to the administrative record; except in unusual circumstances, a court
cannot conduct a de novo review of matters that were or should have
been considered by the INS.76
When an alien challenges an order of deportation, the reviewing
court examines the agency's interpretation of the statutory require-
ments. If the agency misinterpreted the statute, the court will nullify
the agency's action.77 In addition, the court will review the procedures
followed by the agency to ensure that the alien was accorded proce-
dural due process in his or her hearing.78
Before 1980, the Attorney General and the immigration judge had
discretion to determine whether to grant section 243(h) relief.79 The
courts generally gave extreme deference to the decision, and would not
overturn it absent a clear showing of abuse or of a failure to exercise
discretion.80 As the Attorney General's discretion was removed in
1980,8 1 however, the appropriate standard for review is no longer the
"abuse-of-discretion" standard; instead, a reviewing court will apply a
"substantial evidence" standard.82 Under the new standard, a court
has more power to review the determination of the immigration judge,
but the scope of review is necessarily "limited to a review of the record
to determine whether the agency's determination is substantially
supported." 83
The administrative decision regarding an alien's asylum request
heavily influences a court's decision on review. Only with an under-
standing of the narrowness of judicial review can the decisions in cases
reviewing denials of political asylum requests be understood.
75. See, e.g., Tejeda v. INS, 346 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1965). "The formulas for
review developed in large measure out of the due process requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment. .. ." 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 5, § 8.1 Ia, at 8-96.
76. 8 U.S.C. § I105a(a)(4) (1976). A situation in which an alien charges that actions
not reflected in the record are unfair is an exception to this rule. See Shaughnessy v. Ac-
cardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
77. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
78. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903); see Attoh v. INS, 606 F.2d
1273 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
79. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 212.
80. See, e.g., Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980). See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
Section 243(h) relief now must be granted if the alien meets the statutory standard. Al-
though discretion is involved in the determination whether an alien meets the standard, the
final decision to grant or deny the section 243(h) request is not discretionary.
82. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1981).
83. .d. at 1317.
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Political Asylum Claims of Haitian Refugees
To demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution because of
political opinion,84 an alien must show, first, a well-founded fear that
the government of the home country actually would punish or suppress
the alien upon his or her return, and second, that the persecution would
result from a prior expression of political opinion . 5 Denials of claims
for asylum of some citizens of a particular country do not affect later
claims of other citizens from the same country because each claim must
be determined based on its own facts. s6 Each individual determination
must be made in light of conditions in that alien's home country.87
Problems faced by Haitian refugees in the United States are attrib-
utable in part to the numbers in which they have sought refuge here.
Immigration officials estimate that more than 17,000 Haitians are cur-
rently in the United States,88 and it is believed that, of this number,
more than 15,000 have entered since 1972.89 This massive influx of
Haitians into the United States has caused great difficulties for the fed-
eral government. 90 President Reagan's decision that the United States
will patrol the water near Haiti to intercept Haitians attempting to flee
to the United States 9 indicates the increasing gravity of the Haitian
84. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
85. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 131-34 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Joseph, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 70, 72-73 (1968); see also Shkukani v. INS, 435 U.S. 920 (197 1); In re Williams, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 697 (1979); In re Surzycki, 13 I. & N. Dec. 261 (1969).
86. See, e.g., Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Janus & Janek, 12
I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968); see also Santos v. INS, 375 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967).
87. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 475; see also Coriolan v.
INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977). In Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978),
the petitioner requested the court to vacate the decision of the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals denying his § 243(h) request in order to introduce the latest Amnesty International
report on political conditions in Haiti. The court declined to do so, stating that the report
was not material to this petitioner's claim. Id. at 132-33 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c)
(1976)). The court thereby confused materiality to the particular facts underlying this indi-
vidual's petition and materiality to general background underlying the petition. While the
report may not have been relevant to the individual's particular allegations, it may have
been relevant as general background material; some courts have admitted the report on this
basis. See In re Williams, 16 1. & N. Dec. 697, 701 (1979); see also Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d
993, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1977).
88. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
89. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1980, at 16, col. 2.
90. In December 1978, there were more than 8800 exclusion and deportation cases in-
volving Haitians pending before the INS in southern Florida. See Lawyers Committee for
International Human Rights, The Haitians in Miami: Current Immigration Practices in the
United States 1 (Dec. 1978). To resolve this problem, the INS accelerated the exclusion and
deportation proceedings, but was stopped in this effort by the court in Haitian Refugee
Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), which held that the accelerated pro-
ceedings violated the petitioners' due process rights.
91. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). It has been alleged that the
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refugee problem. A proper and just analysis of Haitian asylum claims
therefore is essential.
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Ciiletti,92 more than 4,000 Haitians
seeking political asylum in the United States brought a class action suit
against officials of the federal government and of the INS to obtain
relief for alleged violations of their substantive and procedural asylum
rights. The individual plaintiffs in Haitian Refugee Center were in-
volved in asylum proceedings under the Protocol and INS regulations
and in deportation proceedings in which they sought to present section
243(h) requests.
Under the "Haitian Program," the number of asylum hearings of
Haitians was accelerated from a few per day to more than sixty per
day.93 The plaintiffs alleged that the INS had established the program
because of the great number of Haitians in asylum and deportation
proceedings.94 In the expedited proceedings, Haitian claims were
prejudged as lacking any merit; the proceedings had the sole purpose of
expelling Haitians from the United States. 95 Under the Haitian Pro-
gram, all of the claims for asylum were denied. 96 -Finding that the Hai-
tian Program violated the Haitians' rights to equal protection and due
process of law, Judge King enjoined the government from expelling or
deporting, and from continuing proceedings to expel or deport, the
difficulties that the Haitians have faced in obtaining asylum in the United States are due to
racial bias. See N.Y. Times, May 8, 1980, at 13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1980, at 27, col.
6. Most Haitians are black. T. WEiL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR HAm vii (1973). Haitians are
the first substantial group of black refugees to seek asylum in the United States. See Haitian
Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 45 1.
In addition to racial bias, it has been suggested that Haitians face discrimination be-
cause they come from a country that has friendly relations with the United States. Because
the governments are friendly, the United States may hesitate to grant political asylum to a
Haitian, for the Haitian government might consider this an unfriendly act. Thus, political
considerations may enter into the determination of asylum for Haitians. Seegeneraly Han-
son, Behind the Paper Curtair" Asylum Policy versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 107 (1978).
92. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
93. Id. at 523.
94. Id. at 510. The plaintiffs stated 16 causes of action. As summarized by the court,
causes of action 1-14 challenged various procedural aspects of the expedited proceedings,
cause of action 15 alleged that the program constituted discrimination because of national
origin, and cause of action 16 alleged that the effect of the program was to deprive the
plaintiffs of fundamental fairness in processing their asylum claims. Id. at 457.
95. Id. at 512-13. The expedited proceedings included the refusal to suspend deporta-
tion proceedings upon the making of an asylum claim, the intimidation and penalizing of
those who sought to exercise their right to remain silent, and mass scheduling of asylum
hearings. Id. at 519-26.
96. ld.at510-11.
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plaintiffs until the court could review a detailed plan to be submitted by
the government for the orderly and nondiscriminatory processing of
the plaintiffs' asylum and section 243(h) requests.97
Although the procedural question of the permissibility of the Hai-
tian Program formed the framework of Judge King's opinion, Judge
King also extensively discussed conditions in Haiti.98 Basing his dis-
cussion on the proposition that "[n]o asylum claim can be examined
without an understanding of the conditions in the applicant's home-
land," 99 Judge King, after hearing hours of testimony and examining
reports by such groups as the State Department and Amnesty Interna-
tional, examined the conditions in Haiti underlying the plaintiffs' asy-
lum claims. °° As the likelihood of persecution that an alien faces
depends on the activities of the alien's home government, a Haitian's
claim for political asylum should be evaluated in light of conditions
and government practices in Haiti.
Haiti
Located in the Caribbean, the Haitian Republic occupies the west-
ern third of the island of Hispaniola. l01 With a population of more
than 4.2 million people, Haiti is one of the most densely populated
countries in the world. 10 2 It is also one of the poorest; in 1977, the per
capita income was $232, the lowest in the western hemisphere. 10 3 Its
literacy rate is less then twenty percent.' 0"
The Duvalier family has ruled Haiti since 1957, when Francois
Duvalier was elected President.10 5 During the first years of his rule,
Duvalier systematically eliminated potential centers of opposition.
97. Id. at 532.
98. Id. at 474. Judge King examined persecution on return to Haiti, id. at 476-82,
Haitian prisons, id. at 493-97, Haitian security forces, id. at 497-500, the Haitian legal sys-
tem, id. at 500-03, Haitian politics, id. at 503-06, Haitian society, id. at 506-07, and Haitian
economics, id. at 507-10.
99. Id. at 475. This proposition has been advanced in other cases. See, e.g., Coriolan
v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977); Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 34 (2d Cir. 1963)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
100. 503 F. Supp. at 475-93. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the evidence
concerning conditions in Haiti was relevant only to show the scope of evidence available to
plaintiffs in their individual asylum claims, and thus to corroborate their contention that the
accelerated program violated their rights of due process. "However relevant the conditions
in Haiti might be to a review on the merits of a denial of asylum, that issue was not before
the district court." Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982).
101. For a general discussion of Haitian society, politics, economics, and national secur-
ity, see T. WEIL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR HAITI (1973).
102. Id. at vii.
103. Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, Violations of Human Rights
in Haiti 33 (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as Lawyers Committee].
104. T. WEIL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR HAITI 93 (1973).
105. R. ROTBERG, HAITI, THE POLITICS OF SQUALOR 196 (1971).
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Through the civilian militia, the Tontons Macoutes, politicians were
exiled and their followers harassed, the power of the army was disman-
tled, powerful unions were dissolved, and the clergy and the business
community were sapped of their power.10 6 Duvalier sought to create a
strong black middle class out of a culture in which the leaders were
mulatto or of European descent. The terror that he used to weaken his
opposition was directed at both the peasant class and the ruling elite. 10 7
By dismantling the opposition, Duvalier was able to obtain control;
through the paramilitary forces, he was able to maintain this power. 08
As one commentator stated, "These forces both exercise the law and
are above the law."' 0 9
In 1971, Jean-Claude Duvalier, the nineteen-year-old son of Fran-
qois Duvalier, was named president-for-life of Haiti by his father." 0
Although violations of human fights were well documented under the
rule of Francois Duvalier,' Jean-Claude Duvalier declared his inten-
tion to reverse past practices. " 2 He has, however, reportedly continued
to violate human rights." 3
Although Haiti has a constitution that safeguards individual
fights, these safeguards are suspended when the legislature is not in
session, or for about seven months during the year." 4 The paramilitary
forces continue to control the countryside and to determine for them-
selves whether an individual has committed a crime.' 5 Political pris-
106. See D. NICHOLLS, FROM DESSALINES TO DUVALIER 215-21 (1979).
107. Id. at 214.
108. See R. ROTBERG, HAITI, THE POLITICS OF SQUALOR 225-33 (1971). "This organi-
zation has only one soul: Duvalier, recognizes only one chief: Duvalier, fights for only one
destiny: Duvalier in power." F. DUVALIER, MEMOIRS D'UN LEADER DU TIERS MONDE 324
(1969), reprinted in Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 8.
109. Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 8; see also R. ROTBERG, HAITI, THE POLI-
TICS OF SQUALOR 353-54 (1971).
110. D. NICHOLLS, FROM DESSALINES TO DUVALIER 239 (1979).
I 1. Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 3. The International Commission of Jurists
described his rule in stark terms: "'In the world today there are many authoritarian re-
gimes. Many have at least the merit of being based on an ideology, but the tyranny that
oppresses Haiti has not even this saving grace. A few men have come to power by force and
stayed in power by terror. They seem to have only one aim, to bleed for their own gain one
of the most wretched countries in the world."' Id. (quoting BULLETIN OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, No. 17 (1963)).
112. .d. at4.
113. See Amnesty International, Press Release on Haiti (Dec. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited
as Amnesty International]; N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1981, at 23, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1980,
at 22, col. 1.
114. See Amnesty International, supra note 113; Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at
4-6.
115. Anesty International, supra note 113; Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 7-
11. "The Macoutes exist to repress the people and to check on those people who say bad
things about the government. They have free reign to do whatever they want." Affidavit of
Jean Stenio Louis (Miami, July 1979), reprintedin Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 8.
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oners, a group that includes those who offend the government, are
subject to torture, beatings, and death." 16 Moreover, severe restrictions
are placed on the freedom to participate in the political process' '7 and
on freedoms of speech, press, and assembly." 18 Thus, Haitians are sub-
ject to many violations of their human rights."19
In Haitian Refugee Center, Judge King first discussed the persecu-
tion faced by Haitians upon return to Haiti from a foreign country. He
concluded: "The treatment of returnees in Haiti is part of a systematic
and pervasive oppression of political opposition .... ,,120 Under this
pattern of persecution, 2 returnees either are imprisoned and abused122
or are "greeted with great suspicion" and "undergo harassment."'' 2 3
Such persecution by the Haitian government may be triggered by
either of two forms of action taken by the returnee: 12 4 illegal departure
from Haiti12 5 or a claim of asylum while abroad. 26
"If a Macoute does something wrong like killing someone, some reprimand may be an-
nounced, but even if it is nothing ever happens to the Macoute. He is never punished."
Affidavit of Patrick Lemoine (New York, Nov. 1979), reprinted in id.
116. Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 1l-17a. "Someone who has a personal
confrontation with a member of the Security Forces, or who flees the country and later
returns, may easily be swept up in the cruel and violent dragnet of the Security Forces." Id.
at 12. Moreover, the prisoners are subject to severe psychological and physical abuse while
imprisoned. Id. at 12-14.
117. 1d. at 17a-24. Although free elections were called, one candidate who sought to run
against a Duvalier supporter was forced to withdraw from the race by the government and
subsequently was arrested. Id. at 18.
118. Id. at 24-32; see Amnesty International, supra note 113; N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1980,
at 10, col. 3. For example, at a meeting on human rights held in Haiti in 1979, government
security forces attacked the speaker and beat those in attendance, including representatives
from the United States, French, Canadian, and West German Embassies. Lawyers Commit-
tee, supra note 103, at 29-32.
119. Human rights have been defined as "basic rights intrinsic in man by virtue of his
humanity and his worth as a person." Montes, The Refugees: A Global Movement in Hu-
manism, 25 CATH. LAW. 187, 189 (1980). Then Secretary of State Cyrus Vance defined
human rights: "First there is the right to be free from Governmental violation of the integ-
rity of the person. These include torture, cruel treatment, and punishment. Secondly, the
right to food, shelter, health care and education. While the fulfillment of this right is depen-
dent on the country's stage of development, this may be violated [by] Government inaction
and indifference to the plight of the poor. Third, the right to enjoy civil and political liber-
ties-Freedom of Thought; of Religion; of Assembly; Freedom of Speech; Freedom of Press;
Freedom of Movement both within or outside of one's own country; Freedom to take part in
Government." Id.
120. 503 F. Supp. at 475.
121. Id. at 477, 482; see also Lawyers Committee, supra note 103, at 38-41.
122. See 503 F. Supp. at 478-79; see also Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.
1977); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 203 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
123. 503 F. Supp. at 482.
124. See id. at 480. Political action taken prior to departure from Haiti, the traditional
basis for political asylum, is also a basis of political asylum for Haitians. See notes 146-63 &
accompanying text infra.
125. 503 F. Supp. at 478.
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Judge King also suggested that, even if an individual alien re-
turning to Haiti is not imprisoned or harassed, some government ac-
tions that appear economic may have sufficient characteristics of
political persecution to provide the foundation for political asylum.
The severe poverty in Haiti, he observed, is largely attributable to soci-
ological and political problems. 27 "It is safe to generalize that Haiti's
economy has been neglected while the Duvaliers concentrated their
primary energies on maintaining power."' 28 Judge King, however,
would limit the conclusions to be drawn from the premise that econom-
ics are a function of politics. Not all poor Haitians are entitled to polit-
ical asylum; only Haitians who have been subject to government
actions that "take on a political color" may be entitled to asylum.' 29
Thus, Haitian Refugee Center suggests two distinct bases on which
to find the requisite well-founded fear of political persecution. 130 A
Haitian's political asylum request may be based on possible mistreat-
ment he or she faces on return for actions taken upon or after leaving
Haiti and on conditions in Haiti that caused the Haitian to depart.
These conditions may include government actions that seem economic
but are political, because they are mechanisms by which Duvalier
maintains his power.
Although limited in its holding, Haitian Refugee Center provides a
foundation upon which a Haitian may build a claim for political asy-
lum. The analysis suggested in dicta by Judge King is an expansion of
the doctrine of political asylum. If adopted by other courts and by the
INS, the expansive language of Judge King's opinion may provide
many Haitians with political asylum who previously were unable to
obtain it.
Elements of Political Asylum
Political Persecution
One requirement of political asylum is that the alien demonstrate
a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to the home country.' 3 '
The persecution must result from the alien's political beliefs and must
be inflicted by the government or by a group that the government can-
126. Id. at 477, 480-82.
127. Id. at 508. Judge King cited a report by the Congressional Research Service, which
identified five sociopolitical causes of Haitian poverty that are a result of Duvalier politics:
"Inadequate structure and planning of public administration; an absence of skilled profes-
sionals; an inadequate educational system; problems with aid from external sources; a disor-
ganized and probably corrupt fiscal system." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 509.
130. Id. at 477, 480-82, 508-09.
131. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980).
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not control.1 32 This requirement contemplates that the alien demon-
strate that, because of prior political action, the government would
single out the alien upon return to the country. 133 If an alien would not
be singled out, but would merely be subject to the same governmental
oppression as all citizens, the alien would not be considered subject to
persecution. 134
Early views of what actions constituted persecution were based on
the pre-1965 standard under section 243(h), "physical persecution."1 35
Under this standard, courts agreed that persecution inflicted on an
alien who had returned from abroad would support a section 243(h)
request if the persecution consisted of confinement, torture, death, or
extreme economic sanctions.' 36 In 1965, the standard under section
243(h) was amended to require a showing of a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion rather than a showing of
threatened bodily harm. 137 This amendment shifted the emphasis from
the consequences or the type of the persecution to the motivation un-
derlying the persecution. 38
After the 1965 amendment, the Ninth Circuit in Kovac v. INS 139
broadly defined the manner of persecution sufficient for an asylum re-
quest as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in
race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive."' 40
The Kovac court examined the INS's denial of a request for section
243(h) relief made by a Yugoslavian who deserted his ship, immedi-
ately sought political asylum in the United States, and feared persecu-
tion if returned to Yugoslavia for his denunciation of communism.
The petitioner feared economic retaliation because of his request for
political asylum. The court agreed that "a probability of deliberate im-
position of substantial economic disadvantage upon an alien for rea-
sons of race, religion or political opinion" would support a section
243(h) request.' 4 1 Thus, persecution has been broadly defined to in-
clude the infliction of suffering or harm or the imposition of economic
132. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
133. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Franqois, 15 I. & N.
Dec. 534 (1975); In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1968); see also In re Williams, 16 1. & N.
Dec. 697 (1979).
134. See In re Surzycki, 13 I. & N. Dec. 261, 262 (1969).
135. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214. See
notes 30-36 & accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
137. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918.
138. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). See notes 37-40 & accompanying
text supra.
139. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
140. Id. at 107.
141. Id.
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disadvantage. 142
Traditional Views of Political Action
To obtain political asylum, an alien, in addition to demonstrating
that he or she may be subject to conduct that constitutes persecution,
must show that the persecution results from his or her political ac-
tionS.143 Although what constitutes persecution may be clear, what
constitutes political action is much less well defined. The determina-
tion whether an action is politically motivated takes into account both
the form and the timing of the action.
In the development of the standards for asylum, actions did not
satisfy the political action requirement if they fell outside a narrow cat-
egory of activities that were a response to the way political power was
distributed and wielded in a country.14 The conventional definition of
political action included only actions by a government and by an alien
that were considered political actions in the United States.145
Actions also did not satisfy the political action requirement if they
142. See also A. GRAHL-MADSEN, STATUS OF REFUGEES 201 (1966): "[T]here is prece-
dent for considering the following measures or sanctions 'persecutions' in the sense of the
Refugee Convention, provided that the circumstances warrant it: (1) Threats to a person's
life; (2) Imprisonment or other forms of detention or internment for a period of three
months or more, it remaining an open question whether deprivation for shorter periods may
constitute 'persecution'; however, deprivation of liberty for 10 days or less has been deemed
not to amount to 'persecution'; (3) Numerous arrests or summonses for interrogation; (4) Re-
moval to a remote or designated place, within the home country; (5) Infliction of bodily
harm and serious threats to a person's health. .. ."
143. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
144. Courts sought evidence of membership in an organized political body, see, e.g.,
Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d
227, 233 (5th Cir. 1970); In re Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697, 701 (1979), active opposition to
the Duvalier regime, see, e.g., Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d at 233; In re Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec.
at 701; In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 70 (1968), or some other "political affiliation" in the
home country, see, e.g., Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977).
145. For example, in Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970), a Haitian sought
§ 243(h) relief, alleging that his fear to return to Haiti was based on an altercation with a
member of the Tontons Macoutes. The court found that the Haitian had submitted no evi-
dence concerning membership in a political organization, "political affiliations" or activity,
or opposition to the Duvalier regime while in Haiti. Although not well defined by the court,
these activities generally would be considered political, or in response to the country's polit-
ical structure, if they occurred in the United States. The court did not consider whether the
actions alleged by the Haitian might be considered political when viewed in the context of
Haitian culture. See also, e.g., Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) (petitioner
and family had no political affiliations in Haiti); In re Williams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697, 701
(1979) (petitioner "never belonged to any organizations hostile to the interests of Haiti, [and]
... never expressed any political opinions or acted in a manner which was regarded by the
Haitian authorities as opposed to the interests of that country"). In Coriolan v. INS, 559
F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit rejected the assumption of the immigration
judge "that people without overt political activity, or minority political opinions, are likely
to be the victims of political persecution." See notes 210-15 & accompanying text infra.
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were taken after the alien's departure from the country. Courts have
required some evidence of political action prior to departure from the
home country before granting an alien's political asylum claim. 46
Reviewing the denial of a Haitian's request to reopen deportation
procedures for the submission of additional evidence of a section
243(h) request, the Fifth Circuit in Gena v. INS 147 refused to reopen
the proceedings because the Haitian had not presented evidence show-
ing that he, or any member of his family, had ever opposed the
Duvalier regime or belonged to any political organization while in Hai-
ti.148 The petitioner was a Haitian who sought political asylum in the
United States. In the first deportation hearing, he testified that he left
Haiti because his wife had trouble with the Tontons Macoutes and be-
cause he had fought with the Tontons Macoutes. He had never been
arrested in Haiti, however, and was not a member of a political organi-
zation. In later testimony, he alleged that he opposed the Duvalier
regime and that his departure from Haiti was motivated by fear that his
political opposition would result in harm.1 49 The court rejected this
testimony as unsupported by evidence. As the Haitian's conclusory
statement was the only basis for the claim of affiliation, the court dis-
missed the petition for review. 50
The Fifth Circuit examined the asylum claims of nine other Hai-
tians in Paul v. INS.15' Stating that aliens must prove that their depar-
ture was "politically motivated"1 52 to be granted asylum, the court
denied the Haitians' petition. In dissent, Judge Godbold examined the
Haitians' testimony in detail, stating that, as the petitioners' statements
were the only evidence, the real issue was the credibility of the wit-
nesses.' 53 Judge Godbold examined a State Department telegram ad-
mitted into evidence that concluded that the petitioners "make no
claim to prior persecution, imprisonment, or political affiliation before
their departure from Haiti."1 54 The immigration judge's apparent reli-
146. See Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 196-97 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Blazina v. Bouchard,
286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); Inre Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec.
866 (1968); In re Nghiem, 11 1. & N. Dec. 541 (1966).
147. 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970).
148. Id. at 233.
149. Id. at 229-30.
150. The court was not oblivious to the self-serving nature of the Haitian's claim of
political affiliation. "With respect to his application 'for withholding deportation to Haiti,
[the petitioner] statedfor thefirst time that his political beliefs 'are opposed to the present
government in Haiti,' . . . In addition,for thefirst time he ascribed political significance to
the fight with the assistant chief of the Tonton Macoute . Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
151. 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
152. Id. at 196.
153. Id. at 204 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
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ance on this telegram' 55 suggests that to obtain political asylum an
alien should show prior persecution, imprisonment, or political affilia-
tion. Based on his examination of the petitioners' testimony, however,
Judge Godbold concluded that petitioners met their burden of proving
sufficient prior political action. 156
In In re Williams,' 57 the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed
the denial of a Haitian's section 243(h) request. The Board concluded
that the respondent failed to meet her burden of establishing the claim
for section 243(h) relief. The Board relied on the fact that the respon-
dent "never expressed any political opinions nor took any actions
which the Haitian Government regarded as opposed to the interests of
that country, joined no political organizations, and made no claim that
repercussions resulted to her family in Haiti because of her opinions,
her actions or her departure in 1970."158
Thus, before granting political asylum, courts historically have
sought evidence of traditional political activities, such as joining polit-
ical organizations, expressing political opposition to the government,
being subject to prior imprisonment or persecution for political expres-
sion, or having some other political affiliation in the home country that
will result in persecution if the alien returns there.' 59 These actions all
fall within a conventional definition of a political action: an act that
responds to the political structure of a country or to the way in which
power is distributed and wielded.' 60 This definition, as applied to
aliens who come from cultures different from that of the United States,
155. See id. at 205.
156. "If the statements, or substantial parts of them, are accepted as credible, the conclu-
sion that petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof is, to put it baldly, astonishing." Id.
at 204.
157. 16 I. & N. Dec. 697 (1979).
158. Id. at 701.
159. See also Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (peti-
tioner, a Haitian, presented no evidence of political persecution; petitioner testified that she
"was not a member of any political party or the armed forces"); Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130,
131 (5th Cir. 1977) (petitioner proved no political affiliations); In re Franqois, 15 I. & N.
Dec. 534 (1975) (respondent not politically active in Haiti).
160. Commentators have noted a similarity between political asylum and the "political
offender" exception from extradition. See, e.g., Epps, The Validiy of the Political Offender
Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61
(1979); Note, Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationali Act of 1952 as Amended by
the Refugee Act of 1980: A Prognosis and a- Proposal, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 291 (1980);
Note, Political Asylum in the United States:A Failure of Human Rights Policy, 9 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 133 (1977). One commentator identified three prevalent definitions of political offense
in the context of the extradition exception: (1) an offense that is part of an organized polit-
ical activity; (2) an offense committed with predominantly political characteristics; and
(3) an act justifying nonextradition in order to avoid political persecution, either because the
alien sought to escape from political persecution when he or she committed the offense for
which extradition is sought, or because extradition would result in subjecting the alien to
political persecution. Id. at 143-47.
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however, may be so narrow that it excludes aliens who would be sub-
ject to persecution for actions that the United States may seek to pro-
tect, such as assertions of basic human rights. An alien who can
demonstrate persecution in response to other activities, not convention-
ally considered political, such as the petitioner in Gena who fought
with a member of the Tontons Macoutes, cannot obtain political asy-
lum unless the definition of political action is broadened to include
other factors.
Moreover, as some decisions of the courts and the Board have in-
dicated that an alien must show political action prior to departure from
the home country,1 6 1 an alien who never took part in political activity
in opposition to the government of the home country until after leaving
the country would not merit political asylum. The Board noted in In re
Nghiem, 62 "For the most part [we have] not considered that joining
protest groups and making public statements after entering the United
States supports a withholding of deportation under section 243(h)." 163
Only if this definition is broadened to include actions taken after de-
parture can such an alien obtain political asylum.
Expanded Views of Timing of Political Action
Distinctions in timing between political action at home and polit-
ical action abroad arguably should make no difference in the granting
of asylum if the alien can show that the political action would result in
mistreatment upon return home. For refugees such as Haitians, the
problem of timing cannot be separated from the problem of defining
what constitutes political action, because the act of leaving Haiti, if ille-
gal, and actions taken after leaving may result in persecution upon re-
turn. Such actions, however, may not form a basis for asylum, because
they were not taken in Haiti and because they are not political under
the conventional definition of political action.
Illegal Departure
Upon returning to his or her homeland, an alien may be prose-
cuted for illegal departure from that country.164 The character and ap-
161. See note 146 & accompanying text supra.
162. I1 1. & N. Dec. 541 (1966).
163. Id. at 544; see also Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 950 (1961) (under pre-1965 standard of physical persecution, the court noted that the
plaintiff did not allege that he openly avowed dislike of communism while in Yugoslavia or
on board ship before he jumped ship; § 243(h) request denied); In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. &
N. Dec. 866, 872 (1968) ("We have not regarded with favor an applicant whose first indica-
tion of opposition to the political regime of the country he left is made after arrival in the
United States.").
164. The courts have considered many variations of illegal departure in the context of
§ 243(h) requests, including desertion from ship, see, e.g., Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507
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plication of the law authorizing such prosecution determines whether
the prosecution constitutes political persecution within the scope of sec-
tion 243(h). In determining when an alien may obtain asylum for a
violation of a statute, a court may examine several factors: (1) the kind
of statute involved, (2) the alien's motivation for violating the statute,
(3) the application of the statute, (4) the motivation of the government
in passing and enforcing the statute, and (5) the severity of the punish-
ment imposed for a violation of the statute.
In Blazina v. Bouchard,165 a Yugoslavian sailor who had deserted
ship sought to stay in the United States under the pre-1965 version of
section 243(h), claiming "physical persecution."' 166 The court found
that the possible punishment for his desertion did not constitute perse-
cution, relying principally on two grounds: first, the potential sen-
tence-three months' imprisonment-would not constitute physical
persecution; 167 and second, imprisonment for jumping ship was
deemed "to be a criminal sanction that is reconcilable with generally
recognized concepts of justice."'168
The plaintiff testified that he would be imprisoned if returned to
Yugoslavia because he fled from there, "and those who do that are
punished."' 69 The court inferred from this statement that the prison
term would be given in response to the plaintiff's desertion of ship.' 70
The plaintiff also alleged, however, that he would be subject to persecu-
tion because his desertion indicated an anticommunist feeling, and the
government would persecute him for the expression of this feeling. The
court implied that a politically motivated defection might form the ba-
sis for withholding of deportation, 71 but did not examine the plaintiff's
allegation, thereby avoiding the further question whether desertion
could be an expression of political opinion that would provide a foun-
dation for section 243(h) relief. Refusing to overrule the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision to deny section 243(h) relief, 72 the court stated that it
was within the Attorney General's discretion to determine whether the
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); note 173 infra, violation of a prohibition against
illegal departure, see, e.g., Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963), and defection, see,
e.g., In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
165. 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
166. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
167. 286 F.2d at 511. This basis stems from the court's interpretation of the pre-1965
standard. "The phrase 'physical persecution' should be faken to mean confinement, torture
or death inflicted on account of race, religion, or political viewpoint." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 509.
170. Id.
171. "This contention [that desertion indicates anticommunist feeling, the expression of
which would subject the plaintiff to physical persecution in Yugoslavia] poses a question the
resolution of which is well within the province of the Attorney General." Id. at 511-12.
172. Id. at 512.
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plaintiff satisfied the requirements of that section. 173
The holding in Blazina that desertion of ship does not give rise to a
section 243(h) claim was confirmed in Blagaic v. Flagg. 74 In Blagaic,
the court considered the section 243(h) request of a Yugoslavian who
deserted ship, and held that the immigration officer did not abuse his
discretion in denying the petitioner's section 243(h) request. The peti-
tioner testified that he feared persecution if returned to Yugoslavia be-
cause he deserted ship and that he deserted ship because he feared
reprisal for his refusal to join the communist party aboard
ship. 75 Ignoring the petitioner's motivation for deserting ship, the
court stated that "[w]hether such desertion is an offense under Yugo-
slav law is irrelevant, because punishment for a non-political crime" is
not within the scope of section 243(h). 176 The Blagaic court thus im-
plied that only punishment for a political crime would constitute perse-
cution and that the alien's motivation for violating the statute, which
resulted in punishment, was irrelevant.
A ruling by an INS Special Inquiry Officer that punishment for
illegal departure may never constitute "physical persecution" was re-
versed in Sovich v. Esperdy.177 In Sovich, the appellant had escaped
from Yugoslavia and had fled to Italy, where he was received as a refu-
gee. Eventually, he came to the United States and sought section
243(h) relief from deportation, claiming that he feared imprisonment, if
returned to Yugoslavia, for his anticommunist beliefs and statements
and for his illegal departure from Yugoslavia. 78 The Special Inquiry
Officer ruled that persecution does not include imprisonment for illegal
departure, which is a "conviction for a crime cognizable under the rec-
ognized juridical system."' 79 The court reversed, however, concluding
that, although not all incarceration, even if for political crimes, would
constitute physical persecution, 80 it was erroneous to rule that incar-
ceration for illegal departure may never constitute physical persecution
173. Id. at 511-512. Possible punishment for jumping ship was also a basis of the
§ 243(h) claim of the Yugoslavian sailor in Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 844 (1961). The Diminich court agreed with the Blazina court, finding no
basis for the § 243(h) claim. See also Chao-Ling Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir.
1960) ("prosecution before a military tribunal convened pursuant to laws of a foreign state
to try offenses committed by a member of the military forces of that country" would not
constitute physical persecution under § 243(h)).
174. 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962). The case also was based on the pre-1965 standard of
§ 243(h), physical persecution.
175. Id. at 627.
176. Id.
177. 319 F.2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1963); accord Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.
1977).
178. 319 F.2d at 23.
179. Id. at 27 (quoting recommendation of Special Inquiry Officer).
180. Id. at 29.
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and thus may never serve as the basis for section 243(h) relief.18
In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed two assumptions
underlying the holding of the Special Inquiry Officer that punishment
after conviction for a crime cognizable under the recognized judicial
system may not constitute persecution. 182 First, the court agreed that
punishment for a traditional crime would not ordinarily be within the
scope of section 243(h) because Congress had no intent in enacting that
law to provide a refuge for common criminals. Analogizing to Hitler's
use of a legal system for carrying out his atrocities, however, the court
suggested that a recognized judicial system may encompass punish-
ment that amounts to physical persecution. 8 3 Thus, the prohibition
within a legal system of illegal departure may constitute punishment
within the meaning of section 243(h).
Second, the Sovich court analyzed the Special Inquiry Officer's in-
terpretation of section 243(h). Criticizing his assumption that the viola-
tion of a prohibition against illegal departure is not politically
motivated and thus is outside the scope of section 243(h), the court
stated that, in western societies, a general prohibition against departure
from a country is not traditional, and that such a prohibition is a
"product of modern dictatorships able to control long borders and the
movements of their people within them."'18 4 The court suggested that,
because one who agrees with the government would not violate the
prohibition, the punishment of one who does leave is politically moti-
vated and may constitute punishment because of political opinion. 8 5
Therefore, the Sovich court found that punishment for violation of a
general prohibition against illegal departure, although the prohibition
is part of a "recognized juridical system," may fall within the scope of
section 243(h) if the motivation of the person who violates the prohibi-
tion is political. 8 6
181. Id.




186. Dissenting in So ich, Judge Moore contended that the appellant did not prove that
Yugoslav laws make "escape" a crime, that the government of Yugoslavia punishes people
for the violation of this crime, or that the punishment for the violation that would be in-
flicted on the appellant upon his return would be severe. Id. at 34 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Thus, Judge Moore concluded that there was no basis for the majority's discussion of the
prohibition.
In addition, Judge Moore stated that prosecution for the violation of a crime would fall
within the scope of section 243(h) only if the law were applied discriminatorily or the alien
violated the law because of persecution or a fear of persecution on account of political opin-
ion. The majority's distinction, according to Judge Moore, is merely between escape by
desertion and escape by fleeing across the border: prohibition for the former might exist in a
civilized country, but prohibition for the latter would only exist in a totalitarian country. Id.
at 36. This distinction, however, would lead to inconsistent results: An alien who deserted
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Under the foregoing cases, an alien seeking asylum can base his or
her asylum request upon the possibility of punishment for having de-
parted illegally from the country. This punishment must be political; it
is unclear, however, what aspects of the punishment must be political
to ensure that the alien fears persecution for political opinion. In
Blazina, the alien deserted his ship for political reasons, alleging that
imprisonment for desertion would constitute physical persecution
within the scope of section 243(h). The court disagreed, stating that
punishment for desertion is not within the scope of section 243(h), and
ignoring the alien's allegation that he deserted because of political
opinion. The Blazina court seemed to recognize, however, that defec-
tion, a political act, would fall within the scope of section 243(h). In
Blagaic, the court ignored the alien's political motivation for desertion,
suggesting that only punishment for the violation of a political prohibi-
tion, that is, a prohibition passed by the government for a political rea-
son, would be within the scope of section 243(h). In Sovich, the court
addressed the political basis of an illegal departure, finding that an
alien who had a political motivation for violating the prohibition
would fall within the scope of section 243(h), but did not clarify
whether the alien must also demonstrate that the government had a
political motive for promulgating or enforcing the prohibition.
In addition to distinguishing between political and nonpolitical
punishments, courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have dis-
tinguished between a government's motive in passing a law and an
alien's motive in violating it. In In re Janus & Janek,187 the Board ap-
proved the section 243(h) requests of two Czechoslovakians who had
been tried and sentenced in absentia for their defection from Czecho-
slovakia. Noting that "[tihe act of defection normally has political,
rather than criminal, connotations,"' 8 the Board distinguished a stat-
ute prohibiting defection from a statute imposing criminal sanctions for
unauthorizedtravel. The former is a political statute; the latter is a
political statute only if its provisions are political or if it is administered
in a political manner. The Board, however, emphasized the political
motivation that each defendant had in defecting, rather than the gov-
his or her ship would be denied asylum, whereas an alien who fled across the border would
be granted asylum, although both had the same motivation for fleeing the country. Id. at 37.
Thus, Judge Moore stated that the inquiry should be whether the alien will be prosecuted
under the law because of his or her political opinions, which would provide a basis for
asylum, or because the alien fled the country to avoid this type of oppression, which would
not. Id.
187. 12 1. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
188. Id. at 873. The Board noted that the conviction of Janek involved other facets of
his life, including failure to act as a good citizen in defecting and the taking "advantage of
confidence" shown in him, which suggests that the statute did not "have travel control as its
prime concern." Id.
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ernment's motivation in promulgating the statute.18 9
In Coriolan v. INS, 90 the Fifth Circuit examined the motivations
of both the government and the alien in the context of an allegation
that punishment for illegal departure from Haiti was within the scope
of section 243(h). The court examined the immigration judge's denial
of the section 243(h) requests of two Haitians, Coriolan and Bonannee.
At least partially because their departure from Haiti was illegal, both
feared imprisonment or death if they returned. Although the Haitians'
asserted fear of prosecution was supported only by general allegations
of Haitian policy,191 the immigration judge had conceded that the Hai-
tians might face prosecution in Haiti. As the immigration judge had
not made clear the basis for his decision, the Coriolan court was unsure
of the basis for the denial of section 243(h) relief.
The Coriolan court stated that the immigration judge may have
based his conclusion on a finding that the petitioners did not leave Hai-
ti for political reasons, but concluded that the immigration judge was
incorrect if he had assumed that prosecution for illegal departure can
never amount to political persecution. 92 Under In re Janus & Janek,
an individual's lack of a political motive for departure might be fatal to
the section 243(h) requests even if the government's motive for its re-
sponse was political.' 93 The court suggested, however, that it would
reject the Janus & Janek test: "Whether this would be the view taken
by this court is more doubtful. The motive test, after all, on its face
does not test whether the government's motive for persecution is
political."' 194
Thus, the Coriolan court rejected the requirement that an alien
show that his or her departure was motivated by political opinion.
After Coriolan, persecution based on a fear of punishment for illegal
departure could be the basis of a request for asylum, as long as the
statute was passed by the government for political reasons.' 95
In Haitian Refugee Center, Judge King described the Haitian legal
system as one under which "the criminal statutes are so broad and am-
biguous as to encompass virtually any act (or thought)."' 196 Departure
from Haiti without the prescribed government authorization could be
an illegal act. More importantly, Judge King described how Haitians
189. Id. at 873-75.
190. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
191. Id. at 1000.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis in original).
195. In Coriolan, however, the petitioners alleged other bases for their fears of persecu-
tion in Haiti. Thus, the court relied on more than the potential prosecution for illegal depar-
ture in reversing the immigration judge's denial of the petitioner's section 243(h) requests.
196. 503 F. Supp. at 502.
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who return to Haiti after an illegal exit suffer a pattern of persecu-
tion. 197 In Haiti, illegal departure is a crime that results in punishment.
To use illegal departure as a basis of asylum, a Haitian must show
not only that his or her illegal departure may result in punishment, but
also that it was politically motivated. Under the early cases, Blazina
and Blagaic, a Haitian had to show that he or she committed a political
crime, such as defection, to obtain asylum; merely showing that he or
she left the country for political reasons would be insufficient. Under
Sovich, a Haitian who showed a political reason for leaving would be
able to base an asylum claim on the illegal departure. Sovich left un-
clear, however, whether a showing that the government had political
motivations for adopting the prohibition would satisfy the require-
ments for asylum. The Sovich court did suggest that the severity of
punishment that an alien would face for violating the prohibition
would be relevant to an asylum determination. Thus, a Haitian who
demonstrates a well-founded fear that return to Haiti would result in
severe punishment may have a basis for an asylum request.
Although the Board in In re Janus & Janek emphasized the motive
of the alien in defecting rather than the government's motive in passing
the law, the Coriolan court suggested that persecution in the form of
prosecution for illegal departure could be the basis of a request for asy-
lum if the government had a political motive for passing or enforcing
the statute. Under Coriolan, a Haitian who can show that Haitian au-
thorities have a political motive, as defined by that country's political
system, for enforcing a prohibition against illegal departures may use
the prosecution for illegal departure as a basis for political asylum. If
the government's motive for passing or enforcing a law is political, a
Haitian should be able to obtain asylum by showing a well-founded
fear of persecution for having departed illegally from Haiti.
Claim of Asylum While Abroad
An alien who will be punished if returned to his or her home coun-
try because he or she claimed asylum while abroad may attempt to base
a request for asylum on his or her fear of this punishment. 98 This
basis for asylum differs from one based on a fear of persecution for
having violated a prohibition against illegal departure or against de-
serting ship. In Kovac v. INS, 199 the court distinguished between the
petitioner's allegation that he feared punishment for having deserted
ship and his allegation that he feared punishment for having sought
political asylum in the United States. The petitioner alleged that his
197. Id. at 477-81.
198. See generally Note, Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution Arising from a
Prior Asylum Claim, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 719 (1981).
199. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
request for political asylum would be considered "open defiance and
denunciation of Communism, '"20° and that he would be persecuted for
having requested asylum. The court, finding that the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals had applied erroneous legal standards to this and other
points, vacated the decision.201
Kovac illustrates that a claim of asylum abroad that results in pun-
ishment upon return to the home country is politically motivated in two
ways. First, an individual may express his or her dissent from the
home country by requesting asylum abroad. If the request for political
asylum constitutes an expression of political dissent, then persecution
upon return for having made the request would be persecution for
the expression of political opinion. Second, the claim may not be in-
tended as political dissent, but the government of the alien's home
country may treat the claim as an expression of political dissent or as
an act that is political because other countries may criticize the home
government. If the government views the asylum claim as political, its
response to the claim in the form of punishment or persecution would
constitute a political response. The persecution would then also be on
account of political opinion and would support an asylum request.
In Haitian Refugee Center, Judge King found that Haitians who
returned to Haiti after having claimed asylum abroad were subject to a
pattern of persecution for having made this claim.202 Persons who
sought asylum while abroad were viewed as political opponents of the
Duvalier regime, as having insulted the Duvalier family and defamed
the Haitian nation, and as traitors of the government.20 3 Thus, regard-
less of a Haitian's motive in claiming asylum, he or she became subject
to persecution for having made this claim. The persecution was a re-
sponse to what was deemed to be a political act: expressing opposition
to the Haitian government. As such, it constituted persecution for
political opinion and should have supported an asylum claim.
Arguably, basing a grant of asylum on a fear of persecution be-
cause of a prior asylum request would result in self-generating asylum:
to obtain asylum, one would have only to request asylum. Allowing
self-generating asylum would seem to contravene the purpose of pro-
viding refuge for victims of unreasonable and oppressive governmental
policies who have fled to avoid persecution 2°4 by allowing an alien to
create a likelihood of persecution for conduct after the alien has left the
home country.
The consequences of return to Haiti by a Haitian who is refused
200. Id. at 104.
201. Id. at 107.
202. 503 F. Supp. at 477, 480-81.
203. Id. at 477, 480.
204. See S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (1971).
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asylum, however, can be harsh.205 For this reason, a Haitian who can
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her
asylum request should be granted asylum. The alternative would be
inhumane.
Furthermore, self-generating asylum may not contravene the pur-
pose or procedure of asylum. First, a harsh response, such as a Haitian
may face, may be an unreasonable and oppressive governmental pol-
icy. One goal of asylum is to protect an alien from such policies. 20 6
Second, a government, such as the Haitian government, that deems an
asylum request to be a political statement and punishes an alien for
having made this statement is responding to a political act. Thus, per-
secution in this situation may be deemed to be on account of political
opinion, and within the scope of the asylum provisions. An alien in
this situation therefore should be entitled to asylum.
Expanded View of Form of Political Action
Rejection of Traditional Definitions of Political Action
Prior to Haitian Refugee Center, courts sought some action on the
part of the alien that demonstrated the alien's objection to the political
system of his or her home country.20 7 This action traditionally had to
occur before the alien's departure from the home country, although ac-
tions taken after departure also provided an adequate showing of polit-
ical action.20 8 Conventional definitions of what constitutes political
action or political motivation, however, may be inappropriately applied
to aliens from a country such as Haiti.209
The Fifth Circuit analyzed a conventional definition of political
action in the context of Haiti in Coriolan v. INS.210 In Coriolan, the
immigration judge denied the section 243(h) requests of Coriolan and
Bonannee, who had alleged that the Haitian government would retali-
ate against them for actions they took while in Haiti. Bonannee alleged
that his father was suspected of involvement in an anti-Duvalier move-
ment, that a militiaman had recognized him as a member of his father's
family at a dance, that he had had a fight with the militiaman, and that
205. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 482.
206. See S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (1971).
207. See text accompanying notes 146-63 supra.
208. See text accompanying notes 164-205 supra.
209. Nonetheless, some Haitians have obtained asylum under such definitions. See, e.g.,
In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1968); cf. United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F.
Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Haitian petitioner's writ of habeas corpus sustained under pre-
1965 standard of§ 243(h), physical persecution). Between 1972 and 1979, the State Depart-
ment recommended political asylum for Haitians in more than 240 cases. See In re Wil-
liams, 16 I. & N. Dec. 697, 703 (1979).
210. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
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he had been arrested. 21' Coriolan alleged that he, as well as Bonannee,
feared persecution for his illegal departure from Haiti and that he had
had "small problems" with the police.212
The court recognized that, "although Bonannee and Coriolan are
likely victims of government persecution, what they face is not persecu-
tion for their 'political opinion' as the statute requires. '213 Nonetheless,
the court examined the immigration judge's presumption that "people
without overt political activity, or minority political opinions, are un-
likely to be the victims of political persecution, '214 and concluded that
this presumption is not conclusive. "It may be, in fact, that Haitian
citizens can become the focus of government persecution without ever
taking any conventionally 'political' action at all."'215
The Coriolan court thus recognized that persecution may result
from actions that are not conventionally considered political, and that
the actions of the petitioners in the case before it would not convention-
ally be considered political. Despite the Coriolan court's recognition
that conventional forms of political action do not include all actions
that may give rise to political persecution, an alien who cannot show a
well-founded fear of persecution because of actions conventionally
considered political probably will not obtain asylum unless the courts
continue to broaden the definition of "political."
In Haitian Refugee Center, Judge King expanded the range of ac-
tion that may be considered political. Under the conditions in Haiti as
he analyzed them, Judge King suggested that actions that convention-
ally would not be considerd to be politically motivated are in fact so
motivated.216 Three arguments underlie Judge King's suggestion:
(1) traditional definitions of political dissent are not applicable in Haiti;
(2) because of the absence of a legal system and the prevalence of secret
police, the individual official is often confused with the government,
and personal encounters may manifest political resistance; and (3) Hai-
tian poverty continues because it is Duvalier's means of maintaining
power and is thus a political condition.
Political Dissent More Broadly DefIned
One aspect of political action is that of dissent from the existing
political structure of a country.217 Although it may be assumed that
only intellectuals and leaders of political parties may engage in such
211. Id. at 995-96.
212. Id. at 995.
213. Id. at 1004.
214. Id. at 1001.
215. Id.
216. See 503 F. Supp. at 510.
217. See notes 144-45, 157-60 & accompanying text supra.
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activities, 218 Judge King stated that "[t]he uncontradicted evidence at
trial. . . demonstrates that the 'political opposition' [in Haiti] is quite
broadly defined." 2 19
In contrast to a narrow definition of political dissent as a public
expression of opposition by intellectuals or leaders of political parties,
in Haiti political dissent may be made by those who have little educa-
tion or little power to affect political thought. Political dissent may ex-
ist in a claim of asylum while abroad.220 Because of the extent of
suppression of public discussion and participation in the political pro-
cess, 221 an individual's criticism of his or her poverty under the rule of
Duvalier may also be political dissent.222
Although political dissent is thought of narrowly in the United
States, its broader definition in the context of Haiti means that actions
not considered political here are political in Haiti, and these actions
may cause a Haitian to be punished in Haiti. Although in the United
States this punishment may not occur, its existence in Haiti should not
be overlooked. Such a Haitian should be entitled to political asylum.
The Illusory Distinction Between the Political and the Personal
Except in the major cities, no judicial system exists in Haiti,223 and
the security forces control all activities without the extrinsic limitation
of a rule of law.224 The absence of a functioning legal system means
that what constitutes criminal activity is determined by an individual
official;225 there is no uniform system of rights to be protected.226
The security forces exist to aid the government in maintaining its
power.227 Because of this role, the forces are political organizations,
which bring politics to the Haitian countryside.228 As crime is deter-
mined on an individual level by an official who represents the Haitian
government, an encounter between a citizen and an official, in which
the official determines that the individual has engaged in criminal ac-
218. The State Department team sent to study conditions in Haiti apparently made this
assumption. See 503 F. Supp. at 480.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 503-05.
222. See id. at 505: "One need not join a political party to be viewed as an opponent of
Duvalier. . . . Indeed, one need do very little. Solives Romet testified that his paralytic
grandfather and sick father were arrested and disappeared after they failed to attend a pub-
lic celebration honoring Duvalier. To 'talk bad' about the government is a crime."
223. Id. at 501.
224. Id. at 498.
225. Id. at 502.
226. Id. at 503.
227. Id. at 498-99.
228. Id.
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tivity, is a political encounter although it may appear to be a personal
encounter.
Judge King quoted at length from the testimony to support this
thesis. One Haitian was arrested because he was a friend of someone
sought by the government. 229 Another Haitian rented a bicycle to a
member of the Tontons Macoutes and was attacked when he asked the
man to return the bicycle. 230 Examples also can be found in other
cases.23
Although these encounters appear to be personal rather than offi-
cial, the encounters are peculiarly political because a member of the
militia, a governmental organization, is one of the participants. In Hai-
ti, the distinction between an official and an unofficial act-between
what is political and what is personal-is illusory. Therefore, an en-
counter conventionally considered personal, such as a dispute between
an official and a citizen about the price of a bicycle rented to the official
for personal use, may be a political encounter. An alien who faces per-
secution upon return to Haiti because of such an encounter thus may
face persecution on account of political opinion.
Economics as a Political Condition
Judge King analyzed the economic conditions in Haiti and con-
cluded that its dramatic poverty results from the Duvaliers' efforts to
maintain political power.232 As the economic condition is a result of
the political effort to maintain power, the economic condition itself is a
political condition. An action that a poverty-stricken Haitian takes to
protest the poverty is an action in response to the political condition. A
Haitian who criticizes the government for its economic policies thus
criticizes a political condition. If a Haitian is persecuted for this action,
the Haitian's persecution is for political opinion.
Every poor Haitian, however, does not thereby become a political
refugee upon departure from Haiti. Although the status of poverty
may be a political condition, it is not persecution. A Haitian who
merely is poor and does not express any opposition to the government
229. Id. at 502.
230. Id. at 498-99.
231. In Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970), the court analyzed the § 243(h) re-
quest of a Haitian who left Haiti after a member of the Tontons Macoutes propositioned and
possibly raped his wife. The court'noted that the petitioner had not shown that he would be
likely to be persecuted because of race, religion, or political opinion, apparently concluding
that the encounter between the petitioner and the member of the Tontons Macoutes was
merely a private argument. Id. at 233. In Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977), one
petitioner's father was suspected of antigovernment activity. The petitioner had a fight with
a militiaman, apparently because the militiaman knew of his father, and was later arrested.
Id. at 996.
232. 503 F. Supp. at 507-09.
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or engage in a dispute for which he or she may be punished will not be
subject to persecution on account of political opinion. This Haitian
should not have access to asylum.
Because of the relationship between politics and economics in
Haiti, the traditional distinction between an economic migrant and a
political refugee, as applied in Haiti, is inappropriate.233 One commen-
tator has stated that a political refugee is "forced to leave or stay out of
his state of nationality or habitual residence for political reasons arising
from events occurring between that state and its citizens which make
his stay there impossible or intolerable .... *234 An economic mi-
grant, on the other hand, "freely chooses to live elsewhere and is capa-
ble of having a normal relationship with the authorities of his home
country. ' 235 The essential differences between an economic migrant
and a political refugee are the alien's motivations for leaving and the
alien's relationship with the home country before and after departure.
A Haitian may leave Haiti for many reasons. It would be difficult
to determine whether a Haitian who leaves Haiti in response to eco-
nomic conditions is "forced to leave" or rather "freely chooses to live
elsewhere." If a Haitian leaves absent duress imposed by the govern-
ment merely because he or she desires a better life elsewhere, the Hai-
tian is not "forced to leave" for political reasons, although the
economic reasons for the departure stem from a political act. If, how-
ever, a Haitian leaves because of a dispute with a Haitian official, for
which the official seeks to punish the Haitian, the Haitian may be
forced to leave Haiti for reasons that are political in the context of the
conditions peculiar to Haiti.
A Haitian who has left Haiti may be incapable of returning or of
having a "normal relationship" with Haitian authorities because of the
Haitian government's treatment of those who return from abroad, par-
ticularly those who have claimed asylum abroad.236 Under the conven-
tional distinction between economic migrant and political refugee,
therefore, many Haitians may be political refugees.
In Haitian Refugee Center, Judge King noted that a broad classifi-
cation of all Haitians as economic refugees is inappropriate, but stated
that limits must be placed on the classification of Haitians as political
refugees. 237 Judge King distinguished certain situations that "take on a
233. For a discussion of the distinction between economic and political refugees in the
Haitian context, see Dernis, Haitian Immigrants: Political Refugees or Economic Escapees?,
31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 27 (1976).
234. S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1971).
235. Id. at 96.
236. See notes 202-03 & accompanying text supra.
237. See 503 F. Supp. at 509. "It would certainly be inappropriate to conclude that all
poor Haitians are entitled to political asylum. Virtually the entire country could make such
a claim."
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political color";238 claims based on these actions warrant asylum. To
illustrate this idea, Judge King described the encounter of a Haitian,
Solomon Jocelyn, with the Prefect of the Tontons Macoutes. 239
Jocelyn, the president of a farmers' labor union, wrote a letter to the
Prefect of the Tontons Macoutes protesting the expropriation of land
by the Tontons Macoutes. Jocelyn was jailed for this action. After he
came to the United States, the INS classified Jocelyn's section 243(h)
request as "clearly lacking in substance" because it was based on a per-
sonal dispute;240 this encounter, however, took place in the context of
Francois Duvalier's attempt to gain power by the general suppression
of labor unions. Thus, although the INS treated Jocelyn's claim as
nonpolitical, the claim took on a political color and warranted section
243(h) relief.
In giving Jocelyn's case as an example, Judge King assumed that
the activity for which Jocelyn was sanctioned was "essentially eco-
nomic."241 Arguably, Jocelyn's case would be considered political even
under conventional definitions242 because Jocelyn was the victim of a
planned program to suppress the political opposition of labor unions.
If Jocelyn's case would meet traditional definitions of political action,
then his case is not a good illustration of Judge King's thesis, because
the thesis relies on actions that would be considered economic rather
than political but which take on a political color because of conditions
in Haiti.
A better example of Judge King's thesis is that of Odilius Jean, a
Haitian who rented a bicycle to a member of the Tontons Macoutes
and was attacked by this official when he sought to retrieve the bicy-
cle.243 Because Jean did not criticize the government or otherwise ex-
press political dissent, his subsequent persecution would not
conventionally be considered to be because of political opinion. Jean's
encounter with the member of the Tontons Macoutes was personal; the
official did not act as a representative of the government in stealing the
bicycle and attacking Jean. Finally, Jean's encounter was also essen-
tially economic; the dispute centered on ownership of a bicycle that
Jean rented to the member of the Macoutes but that the member main-
tained he had purchased by paying the daily rental price.2 "
The test of Judge King's thesis thus lies in a situation such as that
of Odilius Jean, rather than that of Solomon Jocelyn. If Jean can show
a well-founded fear of persecution based on this dispute, a court must
238. Id.
239. Id. at 509-10.
240. Id. at 510.
241. Id.
242. See text accompanying notes 159-60 supra.
243. 503 F. Supp. at 499.
244. Id.
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confront the question whether the dispute illustrates political action.
First, the dispute is not one conventionally considered to be political;
Jean did not join any political organizations, take any actions that the
Haitian government regarded as opposed to the interests of the coun-
try, or express a political opinion.245 In a conventional sense, persecu-
tion that Jean may face because of this dispute would not be
persecution for political opinion.
Second, a court may analyze his claim of asylum in light of Haitian
Refugee Center. Rejecting the conventional limitations on the defini-
tion of political opinion, a court could analyze the conditions in Haiti
to find that the absence of a legal system, by allowing arbitrary enforce-
ment of rules determined on an individual basis and by allowing an
individual official to represent the government, can make personal en-
counters political.246 Although Jean's encounter concerned the owner-
ship of a bicycle, which is in essence an economic dispute, economic
oppression in Haiti, enforced by members of the militia, is a strategy to
maintain political power. Such economic oppression is thus political
action. These two aspects of Haitian culture-the failure to distinguish
an individual from his or her official government position and the en-
forcement of economic oppression to maintain political power-could
support a finding that Jean's dispute with the member of the Macoutes
was a political dispute, and that the punishment Jean will face because
of this dispute constitutes persecution on account of political opinion.
Third, Jean may have taken actions after this dispute, such as de-
parting illegally or claiming asylum while abroad, that would result in
persecution on return to Haiti because of the Haitian government's
treatment of the actions as political. If so, these actions and the result-
ing potential for persecution may justify a claim of asylum apart from
the dispute between Jean and the member of the Tontons Macoutes. A
court may consider together these later actions and the persecution that
Jean faces because of the original dispute to find that Jean has shown a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
Conclusion
A court unwilling to broaden the concept of political persecution
to include the analysis suggested by Judge King in Haitian Refugee
Center and yet desirous of avoiding sending an alien such as Odilius
Jean back to his or her home country may rely on dicta from Coriolan
v. INS: "We cannot believe . ..that Congress would have refused
sanctuary to people whose misfortune it was to be the victims of a gov-
ernment which did not require political activity or opinion to trigger its
245. See notes 159-60 & accompanying text supra.
246. See text accompanying notes 223-31 supra.
[Vol. 33
oppression. 2 47 Nonetheless, the Coriolan court recognized that the
provision for political asylum may not protect from persecution all
those who deserve protection.
The humanitarian approach suggested by the Coriolan court is
consistent with previous United States human rights policy, but is not
mandated by the political asylum provision. This provision has been
broadly interpreted by the courts to encompass many aliens who would
be persecuted if returned to their home countries, but who do not fall
within the traditional definitions of "political refugee." It has not been
interpreted as a broad category for the protection of masses of aliens,
but as a selective provision that will protect a few aliens who qualify
for its protection on an individual basis.2 48
The United States historically has welcomed refugees from many
lands. Today, with the great influx of refugees from many parts of the
world, the United States is less willing to accept refugees. The political
and moral problem of providing for the massive influx of refugees has
been placed in the courts through the political asylum provision. The
courts, however, are already overburdened and should not be forced to
solve the refugee problem. A better method of protecting large groups
of refugees, such as Haitians, would be to enact special legislation that
would grant asylum to those who flee oppressive dictatorships that ig-
nore basic human rights.249
Faced with thousands of requests for asylum by Haitian refugees,
a court has few options. It may rely on conventional definitions of
political persecution to send Haitians back to suffer likely persecution
in Haiti. It may broaden the concept of political action to encompass
acts taken in leaving or after leaving Haiti, such as illegal departure
and claiming asylum while abroad, which the Haitian government
treats as political. It may cast aside the conventional definitions of
political action to adopt Judge King's thesis that, in conditions peculiar
to Haiti, disputes that are personal or essentially economic are political
247. 559 F.2d 993, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977).
248. "Traditionally, the American people have responded generously to the individual
needs of all homeless refugees wherever they have been found. But group refugee admis-
sions have generally been concerned with classes of refugees from countries where, for ex-
ample, the United States has had strong historic or cultural ties, or where we have been
directly involved or have had treaty obligations." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 141, 146.
249. Section 101(b) of the Refugee Act of 1980 states that one objective of the Act is to
"provide a permanent and systematic.procedure for the admission to this country of refugees
of special humanitarian concern to the United States. .. ." Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b),
94 Stat. 102, 102. The Senate Report accompanying the Act states that "what refugees will
be deemed of special concern to the American people will be a public policy issue that will
be, as it is now, debated and reviewed continuously by Congress, the President, and the
American people." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 141, 146.
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and can lead to political persecution. Finally, a court may step outside
its role as an interpreter of the asylum laws and declare that, although
aliens do not meet the political asylum standard, they should not be
refused asylum because such refusal would contravene the United
States' strong commitment to human rights.
Within this framework, courts and the INS must decide the polit-
ical asylum claims of individuals. A better solution than forcing these
institutions to decide, possibly, between life and death for aliens such
as Haitians would be to provide special legislation for them in this
country while working to effect an international, humanitarian solution
to their problem. Until this is done, the institutions given the task of
determining asylum claims must do so in a humanitarian way, recog-
nizing that, in cultures outside of the United States, there may not be a
neat distinction between that which is political and that which is eco-
nomic or personal.
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